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Abstract
We study the problem of surplus extraction in the general environ-
ment of McAfee and Reny (1992), and provide two alternative proofs
of their main theorem. The first is an analogue of the classic argu-
ment of Cre´mer and McLean (1985, 1988), using geometric features
of the set of agents’ beliefs to construct a menu of contracts extract-
ing the desired surplus. This argument, which requires a finite state
space, also leads to a counterexample showing that full extraction is
not possible without further significant conditions on agents’ beliefs
or surplus, even if the designer offers an infinite menu of contracts.
The second argument uses duality and applies for an infinite state
space, thus yielding the general result of McAfee and Reny (1992).
By providing a connection to duality, this argument suggests meth-
ods for studying surplus extraction in other models in which agents
or the designer might have objectives other than risk-neutral value
maximization.
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1 Introduction
In most settings with asymmetric information, private information generates
rents for the agents who hold it. This underlies many central results, such
as the inefficiency of outcomes in many mechanisms. A series of important
results by Cre´mer and McLean (1985, 1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992)
proved that such rents can be fragile, however, and depend crucially on the as-
sumption that agents’ private information is independent. If instead agents’
information is correlated, even only to an arbitrarily small degree, then ap-
propriately designed mechanisms can typically leverage this correlation to
extract all, or virtually all, information rents.
Cre´mer and McLean started this important strand of work. They con-
sidered the problem of surplus extraction in two particular settings, the mo-
nopolist screening problem (1985), and private values auctions (1988), each
with agents whose private information is summarized by finitely many types.
McAfee and Reny (1992) instead consider a very general environment, and
allow for infinitely many types. McAfee and Reny (1992) show that a natural
analogue of Cre´mer and McLean’s convex independence condition on beliefs
is necessary and sufficient for virtual surplus extraction in this class of envi-
ronments, meaning that for every ε > 0 a designer can offer a finite menu of
contracts leaving each agent with no more than ε surplus.
As McAfee and Reny argue, considering the infinite type case is not
merely a technical exercise in mathematical completeness, but is of central
importance for understanding the explanatory power of the finite model and
its ability to approximate the infinite case. Although McAfee and Reny’s con-
ditions are natural analogues of Cre´mer and McLean’s for the infinite case,
their result is in no sense a limit of Cre´mer and McLean’s, and they establish
their result by a significantly different argument, from which a connection to
the finite case is not clear. Cre´mer and McLean’s result that full extraction
holds in the finite case can be proven constructively using the separating
hyperplane theorem, while McAfee and Reny’s proof that virtual extraction
holds in the infinite case relies on their elegant generalization of the clas-
sic Stone-Weierstrass approximation theorem. More importantly, from their
work and subsequent work, it is unclear whether the gap between virtual and
full extraction is due to the restriction to a finite menu of contracts, or is
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instead an integral consequence of allowing for infinitely many types.
In this paper we provide two alternative proofs of the main theorem of
McAfee and Reny (1992). Each provides insight into connections between
the finite and infinite types models, including the extent to which the finite
model approximates the infinite one, as well as suggesting novel techniques
and results. The first is a natural analogue of the argument of Cre´mer and
McLean, using geometric features of the set of agents’ beliefs to explicitly
construct a menu of contracts extracting the desired surplus. This argument
requires a finite set of states over which agents are uncertain. By highlighting
the connection to the geometry of the set of beliefs, this argument also leads
to a counterexample showing that full extraction is not possible without
further significant conditions on agents’ beliefs or surplus, even if the designer
offers an infinite menu of contracts. This argument also leads to novel results
on the geometry of finite-dimensional convex sets.
The second argument is based on duality, using the characterization of
extraction as the existence of a solution to a particular family of inequalities.
This argument, while not constructive, applies for an infinite state space,
and thus yields the general result of McAfee and Reny (1992). By providing
a connection to duality, this argument suggests a method for studying sur-
plus extraction in other models in which agents or the designer might have
objectives other than risk-neutral value maximization.
Our use of duality in the surplus extraction problem is inspired by and
builds on the work of Rahman (2012), which introduced duality arguments
to study surplus extraction in arbitrary type spaces. Rahman (2012) argues
that full surplus extraction holds under an analogue of convex independence
in a setting with general type spaces allowing the designer to offer an infinite
menu of contracts, and that this setting includes the environment of McAfee
and Reny (1992) as a special case. We show by example that full extraction
can fail under the assumptions of McAfee and Reny (1992), even allowing
for an infinite menu of contracts. The two proofs we provide shed some
light on why virtual extraction holds while full extraction can fail, and the
extent to which duality arguments can be used to study surplus extraction
in environments more general than the standard model. Other recent pa-
pers have also emphasized the importance of duality for different mechanism
design questions. This includes work on multidimensional screening using
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optimal transport methods by Daskalakis, Deckelbaum, and Tzamos (2017),
and work on optimal auction design under robustness concerns by Carroll
and Segal (2018) and Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017a, b).
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we give some preliminary
definitions and results from convex analysis that will be used throughout
the paper. In section 3 we set up the basic model and definitions, including
notions of surplus extraction. In section 4 we consider the case in which the
state space is finite. We give a necessary condition for full extraction, and use
this to derive a counterexample showing that full extraction can fail under
the assumptions of McAfee and Reny (1992), even if the designer can offer
an infinite menu of contracts. We then give a constructive proof that virtual
extraction holds in this setting. In section 5 we consider the case in which
the state space can be infinite, and provide a proof of the general virtual
extraction result based on duality. Additional results, some of which might
be of independent interest, are collected in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
We recall and collect here some preliminary definitions and results from con-
vex analysis.
Definition 1. Let C ⊆ Rn be a convex set. An extreme point of C is a
point x ∈ C with the property that if x = αy + (1 − α)z for some y, z ∈ C
and some α ∈ [0, 1], then x = y or x = z.
An exposed point of C is a point x ∈ C such that there is some real linear
functional f on Rn such that f(y) < f(x) for all y ∈ C with y 6= x.
Note: Every exposed point is an extreme point, but the converse does not
hold. That is, extreme points need not be exposed. If C has only finitely
many extreme points, however, then every extreme point of C is exposed.
Definition 2. A nonempty subset F ⊆ C of a convex set C is a face of C if
whenever x, y ∈ C and αx+ (1−α)y ∈ F for some α ∈ (0, 1), then x, y ∈ F .
A face F of C is a proper face if it is a proper subset of C.
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Definition 3. A nonempty subset E ⊆ C of a convex set C ⊆ Rn is an
exposed set of C if there is a real linear functional f on Rn such that f(y) ≤
f(x) for all x, y ∈ C with x ∈ E, and f(y) < f(x) if y 6∈ E.
Note: An exposed set is a face, but a face need not be exposed.
Definition 4. Let C ⊆ Rn be a convex set and let W ⊆ Rn be the unique
affine subspace of Rn such that C ⊆ W and such that C has a nonempty
relative interior inW . The dimension of C, denoted dim C, is the dimension
of W .
We record a useful result that connects these concepts next.
Theorem 1. Let C ⊆ Rn be a compact convex set, and F ⊆ C be a proper
face of C. If dim C = ℓ, then dim F < ℓ.
For example, see Simon (2011, Proposition 8.10).
Finally, note that if C ⊆ Rn is a compact, convex set with dim C = 1,
then C has finitely many extreme points (at most 2), and thus all extreme
points of C are exposed.
3 Set-up and Extraction Notions
In this section we lay out the basic set-up and notation used throughout
the paper, and give the definitions of surplus extraction underlying the main
results.
We follow standard notation throughout. For a compact metric space B,
C(B) is the space of continuous real-valued functions on B, and M(B) is
the space of finite signed Borel measures on B. Similarly, ∆(B) is the space
of Borel probability measures on B.
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Throughout, for x ∈ C(B) and η ∈ M(B), we write x · η = η · x for the
inner product 〈x, η〉 = 〈η, x〉, that is,
η · x = x · η = 〈x, η〉 = 〈η, x〉 =
∫
x(b) η(db)
We follow McAfee and Reny (1992) in giving a reduced form description
of the surplus extraction problem. In a prior, unmodeled stage, agents play
a game that leaves them with some information rents as a function of their
private information. Private information is summarized by the type t ∈ T ,
where T denotes the set of possible types. Unless specified otherwise, we
let T = [0, 1] be the set of types (for all of the results it suffices that T is
a compact, convex metric space). The current stage also has an exogenous
source of uncertainty, summarized by a set of states S, on which contract
payments can depend. For some applications, it is natural to take S = T ,
although we follow McAfee and Reny (1992) in allowing S to be arbitrary. We
assume throughout that S is a compact metric space. To each type t ∈ T
is then associated a value v(t) ∈ R, representing the rents from the prior
stage, and beliefs π(t) ∈ ∆(S). Throughout we maintain the assumption
that v : T → R is continuous and that π : T → ∆(S) is norm continuous.
Let
C := co{π(t) ∈ ∆(S) : t ∈ T}
Following our general notation, let ∆(T ) be the set of Borel probability
measures on T . For t ∈ T , δt ∈ ∆(T ) denotes the Dirac measure concentrated
on t. For x ∈ C(T × S) and t ∈ T , we write x(t) ∈ C(S) for the function
such that x(t)(s) = x(t, s) for each s ∈ S.
Next we give definitions for the main notions of surplus extraction in this
setting, full extraction and virtual extraction. Both reflect the idea that the
designer offers agents a menu of stochastic contracts from which they choose,
based on minimizing their expected costs. Exploiting correlation between
types and beliefs might allow the designer to construct such a menu that
leaves every agent with zero expected surplus, in the case of full extraction,
or no more than ε expected surplus for any ε > 0, in the case of virtual
extraction.
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Definition 5. Full extraction holds if, given v : T → R, there exists a
collection {c(t) ∈ C(S) : t ∈ T} such that for each t ∈ T :
v(t)− π(t) · c(t) = 0
and
v(t)− π(t) · c(s) ≤ 0 ∀s 6= t
Virtual extraction holds if, given v : T → R, for each ε > 0 there exists a
collection {cε(t) ∈ C(S) : t ∈ T} such that for each t ∈ T :
0 ≤ v(t)− π(t) · cε(t) ≤ ε
and
v(t)− π(t) · cε(s) ≤ ε ∀s 6= t
As defined, full extraction or virtual extraction might require the designer
to offer an infinite menu of contracts when T is infinite. In the case of virtual
extraction, such a menu need not have an expected cost minimizing element
for all agents. By allowing for an infinite menu of contracts, this might also
appear to be a weaker notion of virtual extraction than considered by McAfee
and Reny (1992), which instead shows that for each ε > 0, there is a finite
menu {c1, . . . , cn} such that for each t ∈ T ,
0 ≤ max
j=1,...,n
{v(t)− π(t) · cj} ≤ ε
We note, however, that whenever virtual extraction holds (using the defini-
tion above), then it is always possible to find a finite menu of contracts that
would achieve the same bounds on surplus. We record this observation and
its proof below.
Theorem 2. If virtual extraction holds, then virtual extraction can be achieved
with a finite menu of contracts. That is, given v : T → R, for each ε > 0
there exists a finite menu {c1, . . . , cn} ⊆ C(S) such that for each t ∈ T ,
0 ≤ max
j=1,...,n
{v(t)− π(t) · cj} ≤ ε
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Proof. Let v : T → R be given and fix ε > 0. Choose {cε(t) ∈ C(S) : t ∈ T}
such that for each t ∈ T :
0 ≤ v(t)− π(t) · cε(t) ≤ ε
and
0 ≤ sup
s∈T
{v(t)− π(t) · cε(s)} ≤ ε
Then for each t ∈ T there exists δt > 0 such that s ∈ Bδt(t)⇒
−ε
2
≤ v(s)− π(s) · cε(t) ≤ ε
Since T is compact and ∪tBδt(t) is an open cover of T , there exists t1, . . . , tn
such that T ⊆ ∪iBδti (ti). Then for each i, set ci = cε(ti) + ε. For each t ∈ T
there exists i such that t ∈ Bδti (ti). Thus
0 ≤ v(t)− π(t) · ci ≤ 2ε
and for each j = 1, . . . , n,
v(t)− π(t) · cj ≤ 2ε
Thus
0 ≤ max
j=1,...,n
{v(t)− π(t) · cj} ≤ 2ε
The result follows.
As with the original formulation of McAfee and Reny (1992), these notions
of full and virtual extraction do not explicitly address incentive compatibility.
When full extraction holds, incentive compatibility will follow. Incentive
compatibility does not necessarily follow from virtual extraction, however;
this would require that the menu of contracts satisfies the additional incentive
constraints v(t)−π(t)·c(s) ≤ v(t)−π(t)·c(t) for all s, t ∈ T . An infinite menu
of contracts might allow for virtual extraction while also satisfying incentive
compatibility. Our results do not address this question directly, although
they suggest that probabilistic independence is not sufficient to guarantee
incentive compatibility, even with an infinite menu; this remains an open
question.
8
Following Cre´mer and McLean (1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992), we
consider conditions on beliefs under which full extraction or virtual extraction
holds. McAfee and Reny (1992) show that virtual extraction is possible
whenever beliefs satisfy the following condition.
Definition 6. Types satisfy probabilistic independence if for all t ∈ T :
π(t) =
∫
π(s)µ(ds) for some µ ∈ ∆(T )⇒ µ = δt
Note: If types satisfy probabilistic independence, then π(t) is an extreme
point of C for each t ∈ T .
Note: If T is finite, then probabilistic independence reduces to the standard
convex independence condition of Cre´mer-McLean, that is
π(t) =
∑
s∈T
µsπ(s) for some µ ∈ ∆(T )⇒ µt = 1
Cre´mer and McLean (1988) show that when T and S are finite, then full
extraction holds whenever beliefs satisfy convex independence. This is no
longer true when T is infinite, as the example in the next section illustrates.
We sketch a standard argument for this classic result next, to motivate the
main ideas we develop in the following sections.
Suppose T and S are finite, and types satisfy convex independence. Fix
a type t ∈ T . Since types satisfy convex independence, π(t) 6∈ co{π(s) : s ∈
T, s 6= t}. Thus there exists z(t) ∈ RS such that
π(t) · z(t) = 0
and
π(s) · z(t) > 0 ∀s ∈ T, s 6= t
That is, π(t) is an exposed point of {π(s) : s ∈ T}, and of C = co{π(s) :
s ∈ T}. Alternatively, by convex independence, {π(s) : s ∈ T} is the set of
extreme points of C; since T is finite this set is finite, so each element π(t)
must also be an exposed point of C. Now consider a contract of the form
c(t) = v(t)+α(t)z(t) where α(t) ∈ R+, which requires the constant payment
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v(t) and a stochastic payment that is a scaled version of z(t) (throughout we
use a constant r ∈ R interchangeably with the function r1(S), where 1(S)
denotes the identity on S). For type t, this contract has expected cost v(t),
as
π(t) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(π(t) · z(t)) = v(t)
while for types s 6= t, the expected cost is
π(s) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(π(s) · z(t))
Since π(s)·z(t) > 0 for all types s 6= t, the designer can take advantage of this
difference in beliefs to set α(t) sufficiently large to make the resulting contract
unattractive to all types s 6= t while keeping the expected cost constant for
type t. To that end, set α(t) > 0 sufficiently large so that
α(t) > max
s 6=t
v(s)− v(t)
π(s) · z(t)
Note that since π(s) · z(t) > 0 for all s 6= t and T is finite, the term on
the right above is well-defined (the ratio is bounded), and thus α(t) is well-
defined. Then for type t,
v(t)− π(t) · c(t) = v(t)− v(t) = 0
while for types s 6= t,
v(s)− π(s) · c(t) = v(s)− v(t)− α(t)(π(s) · z(t)) < 0
by choice of α(t). Repeating this construction for each type t ∈ T yields
a menu {c(t) : t ∈ T} that achieves full extraction. Finally, if in addition
|S| ≥ |T |, then convex independence is satisfied for almost all elements of
∆(S)T .
4 Finite State Space
In this section, we consider the case in which the state space S is finite. With
abuse of notation, we use the symbol S interchangeably for the state space
and its cardinality throughout this section.
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Focusing on the simpler case in which S is finite leads to several important
observations. First, we can connect the extraction problem to the underly-
ing convex geometry, as in the setting with finitely many types. This lets
us establish a more direct connection between the extraction problem with
finitely many types and with infinitely many types. From this connection we
identify a simple necessary condition for full extraction, based on the geom-
etry of the set of beliefs {π(t) : t ∈ T}. This necessary condition sheds light
on why probabilistic independence is no longer sufficient for full extraction
with infinitely many types, and allows us to give an example to illustrate this
breakdown. The example also sheds light on why virtual extraction holds
nonetheless, and on the nature of types to whom some surplus might need to
be left. Finally, these observations lead to a constructive proof that virtual
extraction holds under probabilistic independence, analogous to classic argu-
ments in the finite type case, in which we will explicitly construct a menu of
contracts to achieve extraction of all but at most ε surplus for each ε > 0.
We start with the observation that if full extraction holds, then for each
t ∈ T , π(t) must be an exposed point of {π(s) : s ∈ T} and of C = co{π(s) :
s ∈ T}.
Theorem 3. Let S be finite. If full extraction holds, then for each t ∈ T ,
π(t) is an exposed point of {π(s) : s ∈ T} and of C = co{π(s) : s ∈ T}.
Proof. Fix t ∈ T . Choose v : T → R such that v(s) > v(t) for all s 6= t.
Since full extraction holds, there exists a collection {c(s) ∈ RS : s ∈ T} such
that
v(t)− π(t) · c(t) = 0
and
v(s)− π(s) · c(t) ≤ 0 ∀s 6= t
Write c(t) = v(t) + z(t), where z(t) ∈ RS and with abuse of notation v(t) =
v(t)1S. Since π(t) · c(t) = v(t),
π(t) · z(t) = 0
Then for s 6= t,
π(s) · c(t) = v(t) + π(s) · z(t) ≥ v(s)
Thus
π(s) · z(t) ≥ v(s)− v(t) > 0 ∀s 6= t
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That is, π(t) is an exposed point of {π(s) : s ∈ T}.
Now take π ∈ C = co{π(s) : s ∈ T} ⊆ RS with π 6= π(t). Then by
definition, there exists {t1, . . . , tn} ⊆ T and α1, . . . , αn > 0 with
∑
i αi = 1
such that π =
∑
i αiπ(ti). Since π 6= π(t), there exists i such that ti 6= t.
Then
π · z(t) =
∑
i
αiπ(ti) · z(t) > 0
since ∃i such that ti 6= t and π(ti) · z(t) > 0 for all such ti.
Thus π(t) is an exposed point of C. Since t ∈ T was arbitrary, π(t) is
an exposed point of {π(s) : s ∈ T}, and of C = co{π(s) : s ∈ T} for each
t ∈ T .
This observation motivates the following definition, reframing the neces-
sary condition above in terms of agents’ beliefs.
Definition 7. Type t ∈ T is detectable if ∃ z ∈ RS such that
π(t) · z = 0
π(s) · z > 0 ∀s 6= t
Note: Using this terminology, we can restate Theorem 3 as follows: when
S is finite, full extraction requires that all types are detectable.
Note: Assuming probabilistic independence, a type t is detectable if and
only if π(t) is an exposed point of C.
Next we give an example to illustrate the failure of full extraction when T
is infinite. In the example, probabilistic independence is satisfied, but some
types are not detectable.
Example: Let π : T → ∆(S) be as in Figure 1, and suppose v(t) > v(0)
for all t 6= 0. Note that for every t 6= 0, 1, π(t) is an exposed point of
C = co{π(s) : s ∈ T}, while π(0) and π(1) are extreme points of C that are
12
π(0)
π(1)
Figure 1: Graph of {π(t) : t ∈ T}
π(0)
π(1)
Figure 2: Graph of C = co{π(t) : t ∈ T}; π(0) and π(1) are extreme points
of C that are not exposed.
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not exposed. That is, t is detectable in T for all t 6= 0, 1, while types t = 0
and t = 1 are not detectable in T . See Figures 2 and 3.
To see that these beliefs satisfy probabilistic independence, suppose
π(t) =
∫
π(s) µ(ds) for some t ∈ T and µ ∈ ∆(T )
First suppose t 6∈ {0, 1}. Then since π(t) is an exposed point of C, there
exists z(t) ∈ RS such that
π(t) · z(t) = 0
and
π(s) · z(t) > 0 ∀s 6= t
Then
0 = π(t) · z(t) =
∫
π(s) · z(t) µ(ds)
Since π(s) · z(t) > 0 for all s 6= t and π(t) · z(t) = 0, this implies µ = δt.
Now suppose t ∈ {0, 1}. In this case, there exists z(t) ∈ RS such that
π(t) · z(t) = π(0) · z(t) = π(1) · z(t) = 0
and
π(s) · z(t) > 0 ∀s 6= 0, 1
Then as above,
0 = π(t) · z(t) =
∫
π(s) · z(t) µ(ds)
Since π(s) · z(t) > 0 for all s 6= 0, 1 and π(0) · z(t) = π(1) · z(t) = 0, this
implies supp µ ⊆ {0, 1}. Thus π(t) = απ(0)+(1−α)π(1) for some α ∈ [0, 1].
But since both π(0) and π(1) are extreme points of C, this implies µ = δt.
Thus beliefs satisfy probabilistic independence. Full extraction does not
hold, however, by Theorem 3, since π(0) and π(1) are not exposed points in
C, that is, types t = 0 and t = 1 are not detectable in T .
In this case, it is not difficult to see directly why full extraction fails. As
above, suppose v(t) > v(0) for all t 6= 0. Notice in particular this implies
v(1) > v(0), so the surplus of type 1 is greater than the surplus of type 0. Now
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π(0)
π(1)
Figure 3: Full extraction is impossible when v(t) > v(0) for all t 6= 0.
if full extraction were possible, there must exist a contract c(0) = v(0)+ z(0)
for some z(0) ∈ RS such that
v(0) = π(0) · c(0) = v(0) + π(0) · z(0) ⇐⇒ π(0) · z(0) = 0
and
v(s) ≤ π(s)·c(0) = v(0)+π(s)·z(0) ⇐⇒ π(s)·z(0) ≥ v(s)−v(0) > 0 ∀s 6= 0
Here, however, if π(0) · z = 0 and π(s) · z ≥ 0 for all s ∈ T , it must be the
case that π(1) · z = 0 as well (see Figure 3). But then the contract c(0) must
leave type 1 with strictly positive surplus, as
v(1)− π(1) · c(0) = v(1)− v(0)− π(1) · z(0) = v(1)− v(0) > 0
So any contract that extracts full surplus from type 0 and does not provide
surplus to other types t ∈ (0, 1) must leave strictly positive surplus for type
1. ♦
Although full extraction is not possible in this example, virtual extraction
is. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the idea, and also illustrate that it might
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π(0)
π(1)
π(t)z(t)
Figure 4: Construction of c(t) when π(t) is an exposed point of C.
be necessary to give small rents to some types close to a type that is not
detectable in order to extract surplus from other types from which that type
cannot be distinguished. We sketch the argument here, which then serves as
the template for the general constructive proof we give below.
First, consider the case of t 6∈ {0, 1}, so t is detectable in T and π(t) is
an exposed point of C = co{π(s) : s ∈ T}. Then there exists z(t) ∈ RS such
that
π(t) · z(t) = 0
and
π(s) · z(t) > 0 ∀s 6= t
See Figure 4. Following the idea of the proof for the finite types case, con-
sider a contract of the form c(t) = v(t) + α(t)z(t) that requires the constant
payment v(t) and a stochastic payment some scaled version of z(t). For type
t, this contract has expected cost v(t):
π(t) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(π(t) · z(t)) = v(t)
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π(0)
π(1)
Figure 5: Leaving some surplus for types close to t = 0 might be necessary
to extract surplus from type t = 1.
while for types s 6= t, the expected cost is
π(s) · c(t) = v(t) + α(t)(π(s) · z(t))
As in the finite case, to make this contract unattractive to types s 6= t, we
would like to set α(t) > 0 sufficiently large so that
α(t) > sup
s 6=t
v(s)− v(t)
π(s) · z(t)
The term on the right need not be finite with infinitely many types, however
(indeed, both the denominator and the numerator go to 0 as s→ t), so this
scaling term need not be defined. For types sufficiently close to t, however,
the difference in values v(s)− v(t) is small, so the surplus such types could
gain by choosing the contract c(t) is small, as
v(s)− π(s) · c(t) = v(s)− v(t)− α(t)(π(s) · z(t)) < v(s)− v(t)
Given ε > 0, we can find δ > 0 such that ‖s − t‖ < δ ⇒ v(s) − v(t) < ε.
Since the set of types in T with ‖s− t‖ ≥ δ is compact, we can now choose
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α(t) > 0 sufficiently large so that
α(t) > max
‖s−t‖≥δ
v(s)− v(t)
π(s) · z(t)
For the resulting contract c(t) = v(t) + α(t)z(t),
v(t)− π(t) · c(t) = v(t)− v(t) = 0
and
v(s)− π(s) · c(t) ≤ ε ∀s 6= t
Now consider t ∈ {0, 1}, and without loss of generality take t = 0. First note
that, as depicted in Figure 3, there exists z(0) ∈ RS such that
π(0) · z(0) = π(1) · z(0) = 0
and
π(t) · z(0) > 0 ∀t 6∈ {0, 1}
Then consider T1 = {0, 1} and
C1 = {απ(0) + (1− α)π(1) : α ∈ [0, 1]} = co{π(0), π(1)}
In C1, π(0) is an exposed point, thus there exists z1(0) ∈ RS such that
π(0) · z1(0) = 0
and
π · z1(0) > 0 ∀π ∈ C1 \ {π(0)}
In particular,
π(1) · z1(0) > 0
See Figures 6 and 7. Mimicking the construction in the previous case for a
detectable type, choose α1(0) > 0 sufficiently large so that
α1(0) >
v(1)− v(0)
π(1) · z1(0)
Then set
c1(0) = v(0) + α1(0)z1(0)
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π(0)
π(1)
Figure 6: Graph of C1 = {απ(0) + (1− α)π(1) : α ∈ [0, 1]}.
π(0)
π(1)
z1(0)
Figure 7: Construction of c1(0).
By construction,
v(0)− π(0) · c1(0) = v(0)− v(0)− α1(0)(π(0) · z1(0))
= v(0)− v(0) = 0
and
v(1)− π(1) · c1(0) = v(1)− v(0)− α1(0)(π(1) · z1(0)) < 0
The contract c1(0) might leave surplus to some types t 6∈ {0, 1}, however. To
take care of this, we can use the additional stochastic payment z(0), which
type 0 and type 1 believe has expected value of zero. Since all other types
believe z(0) has positive expected value, we can appropriately scale z(0) to
ensure that no more than ε expected surplus is left for all such types, as
follows.
Note that the surplus c1(0) leaves to types arbitrarily close to 0 must
be arbitrarily small, since c1(0) leaves zero surplus for type 0. Then choose
δ > 0 such that ‖s− 0‖ < δ ⇒
v(s)− π(s) · c1(0) = v(s)− v(0)− α1(0)(π(s) · z1(0)) < ε
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This is possible, by the continuity of v and π, and the fact that
v(0)− π(0) · c1(0) = 0
Then set α(0) > 0 such that
α(0) > max
‖s−0‖≥δ
v(s)− π(s) · c1(0)
π(s) · z(0)
Then set
c(0) = v(0) + α1(0)z1(0) + α(0)z(0) = c1(0) + α(0)z(0)
By construction,
π(0) · c(0) = π(0) · c1(0) and π(1) · c(0) = π(1) · c1(0)
Thus
v(0)− π(0) · c(0) = 0
and
v(1)− π(1) · c(0) < 0
For t 6∈ {0, 1}, again by construction,
v(t)− π(t) · c(0) = v(t)− π(t) · c1(0)− α(0)(π(t) · z(0))
< ε
The collection {c(t) : t ∈ T} thus constructed achieves extraction of all but
at most ε surplus.
Now we will show that an analogous construction works in general when-
ever probabilistic independence is satisfied to yield a collection of contracts
that achieves virtual extraction.
Theorem 4. Let S be finite. If types satisfy probabilistic independence, then
virtual extraction holds.
Proof. Let v : T → R be given. Fix ε > 0. We will construct a menu
{c(s) ∈ C(S) : s ∈ T} such that for each t ∈ T , v(t) − π(t) · c(t) = 0
and v(t) − π(t) · c(s) ≤ ε for each s 6= t. We consider the construction
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for a detectable type first, and then consider the case of types that are not
detectable.
Case 1: Consider first the case in which t ∈ T is detectable. In this case,
choose z(t) ∈ RS such that
π(t) · z(t) = 0
π(s) · z(t) > 0 ∀s 6= t
Choose δ > 0 such that ‖s− t‖ < δ ⇒
|v(s)− v(t)| < ε
Set α(t) > 0 such that
α(t) > max
‖s−t‖≥δ
v(s)− v(t)
π(s) · z(t)
Note that α(t) is well-defined (i.e., finite) since {s ∈ T : ‖s − t‖ ≥ δ} is
compact, v and π are continuous, and π(s) · z(t) > 0 for all s 6= t.
Then define a contract c(t) as follows (here and in what follows, we use the
constant r ∈ R interchangeably with the constant vector (r, . . . , r) ∈ RS):
c(t) = v(t) + α(t)z(t)
Now for type t:
v(t)− π(t) · c(t) = v(t)− v(t)− α(t)(π(t) · z(t))
= v(t)− v(t)− 0
= 0
For types s 6= t, first suppose ‖s− t‖ ≥ δ. Then
v(s)− π(s) · c(t) = v(s)− v(t)− α(t)(π(s) · z(t))
< 0
21
by definition of α(t). If instead ‖s− t‖ < δ, then
v(s)− π(s) · c(t) = v(s)− v(t)− α(t)(π(s) · z(t))
< v(s)− v(t) since π(s) · z(t) > 0 and α(t) > 0
< ε since ‖s− t‖ < δ
Thus for all types s 6= t:
v(s)− π(s) · c(t) < ε
Case 2: Now consider the case in which type t1 ∈ T is not detectable.
Since π(t1) is an extreme point of C but not an exposed point, there exists
z(t1) ∈ RS such that
π(t1) · z(t1) = 0
π(s) · z(t1) ≥ 0 ∀s 6= t
π · z(t1) > 0 for some π ∈ C
Set
T1 = {t ∈ T : π(t) · z(t1) = 0}
Note that T1 is compact, and since t1 is not detectable, T1 must contain some
elements other than t1.
Set
C1 = {π ∈ C : π · z(t1) = 0}
Note that C1 ⊆ C is compact and convex, C1 is a proper face of C, and
co{π(t) : t ∈ T1} ⊆ C1. In addition, since C1 ⊆ C, π(t1) is an extreme point
of C1. As such, π(t1) is either an exposed point of C1, or an extreme point
of C1 that is not exposed. We consider the two cases in turn.
First suppose π(t1) is an exposed point of C1. This implies π(t1) is an
exposed point of co{π(t) : t ∈ T1}, and in particular, that t1 is detectable
in T1. Repeating the construction in Case 1, there exists z1(t1) ∈ RS and
α1(t1) > 0 such that, with
c1(t1) = v(t1) + α1(t1)z1(t1)
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we have
v(t1)− π(t1) · c1(t1) = 0
and
v(t)− π(t) · c1(t1) < 1
2
ε ∀t ∈ T1
Then for every t ∈ T1, there exists δ(t) > 0 such that ‖s− t‖ < δ(t)⇒
|v(t)− π(t) · c1(t1)− [v(s)− π(s) · c1(t1)]| < 1
2
ε
The collection {Bδ(t)(t) : t ∈ T1} is an open cover of T1, and T1 is compact,
so there exists {t1, . . . , tm} such that
T1 ⊆ ∪jBδ(tj )(tj)
Note that ∪jBδ(tj )(tj) is open, so T \ ∪jBδ(tj )(tj) is compact. And by con-
struction, for all t ∈ ∪jBδ(tj )(tj),
v(t)− π(t) · c1(t1) < ε
Now set R > 0 so that
R > max
s∈T\∪jBδ(tj)(t
j ))
v(s)− π(s) · c1(t1)
From above, note that
π(t) · z(t1) = 0 ∀t ∈ T1
π(s) · z(t1) > 0 ∀s ∈ T \ T1 ⊇ T \ ∪jBδ(tj )(tj)
Now choose α2(t1) > 0 such that
α2(t1) >
R
π(s) · z(t1) ∀s ∈ T \ ∪jBδ(tj )(t
j)
Then set the contract c(t1) to be
c(t1) = c1(t1) + α2(t1)z(t1)
For each t ∈ T1:
π(t) · c(t1) = π(t) · c1(t1)
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Thus for every t ∈ T1,
v(t)− π(t) · c(t1) = v(t)− π(t) · c1(t1) < ε
and
v(t1)− π(t1) · c(t1) = v(t1)− π(t1) · c1(t1) = 0
For t ∈ T \ T1:
• if t ∈ ∪jBδ(tj )(tj):
v(t)− π(t) · c(t1) = v(t)− π(t) · c1(t1)− α2(t1)(π(t) · z(t1))
< v(t)− π(t) · c1(t1) since π(t) · z(t1) > 0
<
1
2
ε+
1
2
ε = ε by construction
• if t ∈ T \ ∪jBδ(tj )(tj):
v(t)− π(t) · c(t1) = v(t)− π(t) · c1(t1)− α2(t1)(π(t) · z(t1))
< 0 by choice of α2(t1)
Thus for all t ∈ T \ {t1}:
v(t)− π(t) · c(t1) < ε
and
v(t1)− π(t1) · c(t1) = 0
If π(t1) is not an exposed point of C1, then repeating this argument for
the construction of C1 and T1, there is a sequence {C0, C1, . . . , Cn} with
C0 = C, Cn = {π(t1)}, where Ci+1 ⊆ Ci is a proper face of Ci for each i,
and corresponding sequences {T0, T1, . . . , Tn} and {z1, . . . , zn} with T0 = T ,
Tn = {t1}, where Ti+1 ⊆ Ti is compact for each i, such that
π · zi = 0 ∀π ∈ Ci
π · zi > 0 ∀π ∈ Ci−1 \ Ci
In addition, for each i,
Ti = {t ∈ Ti−1 : π(t) · zi = 0} = {t ∈ Ti−1 : π(t) ∈ Ci}
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This sequence must terminate with Cn = {π(t1)} and Tn = {t1}, because
Ci+1 is a proper face of Ci for each i, which implies dim Ci+1 ≤ dim Ci − 1,
and π(t1) is an extreme point of C and thus an extreme point of Ci ⊆ C for
each i. Then since dim C ≤ S, this construction must eventually terminate
with some j such that π(t1) is an exposed point of Cj.
Now consider Tn−1 and Tn = {t1}. By construction, π(t1) is an exposed
point of Cn−1, and
π(t1) · zn = 0
π(t) · zn > 0 ∀t ∈ Tn−1 \ {t1}
The argument above, with Cn−1 in place of C1, shows that there is a
contract cn−1(t1) such that
v(t1)− π(t1) · cn−1(t1) = 0
and
v(t)− π(t) · cn−1(t1) < 1
n
ε ∀t ∈ Tn−1
Now we claim, by induction, that for each k = 0, . . . , n−1, there is a contract
ck(t1) such that
v(t1)− π(t1) · ck(t1) = 0
and
v(t)− π(t) · ck(t1) < n− k
n
ε ∀t ∈ Tk
To see this, fix i ≥ 0 and suppose there exists ci(t1) such that
v(t1)− π(t1) · ci(t1) = 0
and
v(t)− π(t) · ci(t1) < n− i
n
ε ∀t ∈ Ti
Then we claim that there exists ci−1(t1) such that
v(t1)− π(t1) · ci−1(t1) = 0
and
v(t)− π(t) · ci−1(t1) < n− (i− 1)
n
ε ∀t ∈ Ti−1
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To show this, we mimic the argument above. For each t ∈ Ti, there exists
δ(t) > 0 such that ‖s− t‖ < δ(t)⇒
|v(t)− π(t) · ci(t)− [v(s)− π(s) · ci(t1)]| < 1
n
ε
Then ∪t∈TiBδ(t)(t) is an open cover of the compact set Ti, so there exists
{t1, . . . , tm} ⊆ Ti such that Ti ⊆ ∪jBδ(tj )(tj). Moreover, ∪jBδ(tj )(tj) is open,
so Ti−1 \ ∪jBδ(tj )(tj) is compact. Choose Ri > 0 such that
Ri > max
t∈Ti−1\∪jBδ(tj )(t
j)
v(t)− π(t) · ci(t)
and choose αi(t1) > 0 such that
αi(t1) > max
t∈Ti−1\∪jBδ(tj)(t
j )
Ri
π(t) · zi(t1)
Then set
ci−1(t1) = ci(t1) + αi(t1) · zi(t1)
For each t ∈ Ti:
v(t)− π(t) · ci−1(t1) = v(t)− π(t) · ci(t1)
<
n− i
n
ε
<
n− (i− 1)
n
ε
and
v(t1)− π(t1) · ci−1(t1) = v(t1)− π(t1) · ci(t1) = 0
For t ∈ Ti−1 \ Ti:
• if t ∈ ∪jBδ(tj )(tj):
v(t)− π(t) · ci−1(t1) = v(t)− π(t) · ci(t1)− αi(t1)(π(t) · zi(t1))
< v(t)− π(t) · ci(t1) since π(t) · zi(t1) > 0
<
n− i
n
ε+
1
n
ε by construction
=
n− (i− 1)
n
ε
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• if t ∈ Ti−1 \ ∪jBδ(tj )(tj):
v(t)− π(t) · ci−1(t1) = v(t)− π(t) · ci(t1)− αi(t1)(π(t) · zi(t1))
< 0 by choice of αi(t1)
Thus for all t ∈ Ti−1 \ {t1},
v(t)− π(t) · ci−1(t1) < n− (i− 1)
n
ε
and
v(t1)− π(t1) · ci−1(t1) = 0
Thus by induction, for each k there exists a contract ck(t1) such that for all
t ∈ Tk \ {t1},
v(t)− π(t) · ck(t1) < n− k
n
ε
and
v(t1)− π(t1) · ck(t1) = 0
In particular, consider k = 0: there exists c(t1) = c0(t1) such that for all
t ∈ T0 \ {t1} = T \ {t1},
v(t)− π(t) · c(t1) < n
n
ε = ε
and
v(t1)− π(t1) · c(t1) = 0
Combining Cases 1 and 2, the collection {c(t) : t ∈ T} as constructed
above then satisfies the desired bounds, as by construction, for each t ∈ T :
v(t)− π(t) · c(t) = 0
and for all s 6= t:
v(t)− π(t) · c(s) ≤ ε
Thus virtual extraction holds.
27
A careful reading of the previous proof reveals a parallel set of ideas and
results about convex sets and their extreme points that helps to illuminate
the connection between the extraction problems with finitely and infinitely
many types, and which might be of independent interest. We develop these
next.
We start with a weaker notion of exposed point for a convex set, moti-
vated by the above construction of contracts for the case when types are not
detectable.
Definition 8. Let C be a convex set. A point x ∈ C is eventually exposed
if there exists a sequence {F0, F1, . . . , Fn} of subsets of C such that
(i) F0 = C, Fn = {x}
(ii) dim Fi ≥ 1 for i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1
(iii) for each i, Fi+1 ⊆ Fi and Fi+1 is an exposed face of Fi
Note: If C is a convex set and x ∈ C is an exposed point of C, then x is
also eventually exposed, using the trivial sequence F0 = C and F1 = {x}.
Note: If C is compact and convex and x ∈ C is eventually exposed, then
each set Fi is compact and convex. In addition, x is an exposed point in the
set Fn−1.
Next, we show that while a convex set can have extreme points that
are not exposed, every extreme point in a compact, convex subset of RS is
eventually exposed.
Theorem 5. Let C be a compact, convex subset of RS. If x ∈ C is an
extreme point then it must be eventually exposed.
Proof. Since x ∈ C is an extreme point, there exists z1 ∈ RS such that
x · z1 = 0
y · z1 ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ C
y · z1 > 0 for some y ∈ C
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Set
F1 = {y ∈ C : y · z1 = 0}
Since x is not an exposed point of C, F1 is a proper face of C, so dim F1 <
dim C, and dim F1 ≥ 1.
If x is an exposed point of F1, we are done, setting F2 = {x}. Else, x must
be an extreme point of F1 (since F1 ⊆ C) that is not exposed. Repeating the
above argument, choose z2 ∈ RS such that
x · z2 = 0
y · z2 ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ F1
y · z2 > 0 for some y ∈ F1
Set
F2 = {y ∈ F1 : y · z2 = 0}
If x is an exposed point of F2, we are done. Else, F2 is a proper face of F1
and
1 ≤ dim F2 < dim F1 ≤ dim C − 1
Repeating this argument, since dim Fi ≤ dim Fi−1−1 for each i, eventually
must have dim Fn = 1, and then because x is an extreme point of Fn, must
also have x is an exposed point of Fn.
Returning to the extraction problem, these definitions and results suggest
analogous conditions connecting types to beliefs, and the geometry of the set
of beliefs, as with the connection between exposed points and detectable
types. First, we extend the notion of a detectable type to a set of types in
the natural way.
Definition 9. A set of types T ∗ ⊆ T is detectable in T if there exists z ∈ RS
such that
π(t) · z = 0 ∀t ∈ T ∗
π(t) · z > 0 ∀t ∈ T \ T ∗
Next, in analogy with the connection between exposed points and eventu-
ally exposed points, there is a natural notion of eventually detectable types.
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Definition 10. A type t∗ ∈ T is eventually detectable if there is a nested
sequence of compact sets {T0, T1, . . . , Tn} with T0 = T , Tn = {t∗}, and
Ti+1 ⊆ Ti for each i, and a corresponding sequence {z1, . . . , zn} ⊆ RS such
that for each i = 1, . . . , n,
π(t) · zi = 0 ∀t ∈ Ti
π(t) · zi > 0 ∀t ∈ Ti−1 \ Ti
Note: A type t∗ ∈ T is eventually detectable if there is a nested sequence
of compact sets {T0, T1, . . . , Tn}, with T0 = T , Tn = {t∗}, and Ti+1 ⊆ Ti for
each i such that Ti+1 is detectable in Ti for each i.
Note: If t∗ ∈ T is detectable, then it is eventually detectable, using the
trivial sequence T0 = T , T1 = {t∗}.
Next we show that when S is finite and types satisfy probabilistic inde-
pendence, then while types need not be detectable, every type is eventually
detectable. This in turn guarantees that virtual extraction holds, as we
showed in the proof of Theorem 4.
Theorem 6. Let S be finite.
(i) If every type is eventually detectable, then virtual extraction holds.
(ii) If types satisfy probabilistic independence, then every type is eventually
detectable.
Proof. Part (i) follows from the proof of Theorem 4. For (ii), let t∗ ∈ T .
By probabilistic independence, π(t∗) is an extreme point of C. If t∗ is not
detectable, then π(t∗) is an extreme point of C that is not exposed. Hence
by Theorem 5, π(t∗) is eventually exposed in C. Thus there is a sequence
{F0, F1, . . . , Fn} with F0 = C, Fn = {π(t∗)}, and a corresponding sequence
{z1, . . . , zn} such that for each i, π(t∗) ∈ Fi and
π · zi = 0 ∀π ∈ Fi
π · zi > 0 ∀π ∈ Fi−1 \ Fi
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Set T0 = T , and
T1 = {t ∈ T : π(t) ∈ F1}
Note that since T and F1 are compact and the map t 7→ π(t) is continuous,
T1 is compact. Then for each i ≥ 2, set
Ti = {t ∈ Ti−1 : π(t) ∈ Fi}
By induction, Ti is compact for each i, and by construction Ti ⊆ Ti−1 for
each i. Also by construction,
Tn = {t ∈ Tn−1 : π(t) ∈ Fn = {π(t∗)} = {t∗}
Then let m be the minimum index i for which Ti = {t∗}. Consider the se-
quence {T0, T1, . . . , Tm} and the corresponding sequence {z1, . . . , zm}. Then
for each i = 1, . . . , m,
π(t) · zi = 0 ∀t ∈ Ti
π(t) · zi > 0 ∀t ∈ Ti−1 \ Ti
Thus t∗ is eventually detectable.
As Example 1 illustrated, full extraction requires that all types are de-
tectable. With infinitely many types however, this is not sufficient for full
extraction. We close this section by noting a stronger condition which is
sufficient for full extraction in general, and then see that these conditions
collapse in the case of finitely many types.1
Definition 11. A type t∗ ∈ T is strongly detectable if there exists z ∈ RS
such that
π(t∗) · z = 0
and
inf
t6=t∗
π(t) · z > 0
1 See McAfee and Reny (1992) for a discussion of several other sufficient conditions for
full extraction when T is infinite.
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Note that if all types are strongly detectable, then full extraction is pos-
sible for any t 7→ v(t), and any type set T . This follows from the basic
argument for the finite case, as sketched and adapted above. Also note that
when T is finite and types satisfy probabilistic independence, which is equiv-
alent to convex independence because T is finite, then all types are strongly
detectable. We record these observations below.
Theorem 7. Let S be finite. If all types are strongly detectable, then full
extraction holds for any π : T → ∆(S) and any v : T → R.
Proof. Fix v : T → R. For each t ∈ T , choose z(t) ∈ RS such that
π(t) · z(t) = 0
and
inf
s 6=t
π(s) · z(t) > 0
Since all types are strongly detectable, such a z(t) exists for each t ∈ T by
definition. Then fix t ∈ T , and set c(t) = v(t) + α(t)z(t) where α(t) > 0 is
chosen sufficiently large so that
α(t) > sup
s 6=t
v(s)− v(t)
π(s) · z(t)
Such an α(t) > 0 exists since infs 6=t π(s) · z(t) > 0.
Then for type t,
v(t)− π(t) · c(t) = v(t)− v(t) = 0
while for types s 6= t,
v(s)− π(s) · c(t) = v(s)− v(t)− α(t)(π(s) · z(t)) < 0
by choice of α(t). Repeating this construction for each type t ∈ T yields a
menu {c(t) : t ∈ T} that achieves full extraction.
Theorem 8. Let S be finite. If T is finite and types satisfy probabilistic
independence, then all types are strongly detectable.
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Proof. Fix t ∈ T . Since types satisfy probabilistic independence, π(t) 6∈
co{π(s) : s ∈ T, s 6= t}. Thus there exists z(t) ∈ RS such that
π(t) · z(t) = 0
and
π(s) · z(t) > 0 ∀s ∈ T, s 6= t
Then
inf
s 6=t
π(s) · z(t) > 0
since T is finite. Thus t is strongly detectable by definition. Repeating for
each t ∈ T yields the result.
5 General State Space
In this section we consider the general case in which the state space S is
an arbitrary compact metric space. For example, this allows the model to
accommodate the case in which S = T , or more generally when |S| ≥ |T |.
We start by again considering the problem of full extraction, and cast
the problem in slightly stronger terms (we will see that while this gives a
stronger condition, probabilistic independence guarantees that virtual ex-
traction holds under this stronger condition). Rather than looking for a
collection of contracts {c(t) ∈ C(S) : t ∈ T}, we add the requirement that
the contracts also be jointly continuous in types and states, and thus con-
sider the existence of a schedule of contracts c ∈ C(T ×S) such that for each
t ∈ T :
v(t)− π(t) · c(t) = 0
v(t)− π(t) · c(s) ≤ 0 ∀s 6= t
First, we note that full extraction is equivalent to the seemingly weaker
condition weak full extraction
v(t)− π(t) · c(t) ≥ 0
v(t)− π(t) · c(s) ≤ 0 ∀s 6= t
We establish this equivalence in the lemma below.
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Lemma 1. For each v : T → R, c ∈ C(T ×S) satisfies full extraction if and
only if c satisfies weak full extraction.
Proof. Full extraction clearly implies weak full extraction. To see that these
are equivalent, fix v : T → R and t ∈ T . Then choose a sequence sn → t
with sn 6= t for each n; this is possible by the connectedness of T . Suppose
c ∈ C(T × S) satisfies weak full extraction. Then for each n, since sn 6= t,
v(sn)− π(sn) · c(t) ≤ 0
and
v(t)− π(t) · c(t) ≥ 0
Since v(sn)→ v(t) and π(sn)→ π(t),
v(t)− π(t) · c(t) ≤ 0
Thus
v(t)− π(t) · c(t) = 0
Since t ∈ T was arbitrary, the equivalence follows.
From Lemma 1, it is enough to consider the relaxed problem of weak full
extraction. Now write
c(t) = v(t) + z(t)
where z ∈ C(T × S), and we use v(t) ∈ R interchangeably with v(t)1(S),
where 1(S) denotes the identity on S. Note that any c ∈ C(T × S) can be
written this way for appropriate choice of z. Then c satisfies full extraction
if and only if for each t ∈ T ,
π(t) · z(t) ≤ 0
π(t) · z(s) ≥ v(t)− v(s) ∀s 6= t
This follows from observing that for each t,
v(t)− π(t) · c(t) = v(t)− v(t)− π(t) · z(t) = −π(t) · z(t)
and
v(t)− π(t) · c(s) = v(t)− v(s)− π(t) · z(s)
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Thus we will consider the existence of z ∈ C(T ×S) such that for each t ∈ T ,
π(t) · z(t) ≤ 0
π(t) · z(s) ≥ v(t)− v(s) ∀s 6= t
To that end, let f : T × C(T × S)→ R be given by
f(t, z) = π(t) · z(t)
and for each t ∈ T , let ft : C(T × S) → R be given by ft(z) = f(t, z).
Similarly, let g : T × T × C(T × S)→ R be given by
g(s,t)(z) := g(s, t, z) = π(s) · z(t)
Then to show that full extraction is possible, it suffices to show that there
exists z ∈ C(T × S) such that
f(t, z) ≤ 0 ∀t ∈ T
g(t, s, z) ≥ v(t)− v(s) ∀s 6= t, ∀t ∈ T
Note: For each t ∈ T , ft is convex, and for every t, s ∈ T , g(t,s) is concave.
(Both are in fact linear.) In addition, f(0) = g(0) = 0.
Now consider the problem
p∗ := inf
c∈R, z∈C(T×S)
c
subject to f(t, z) ≤ c ∀t ∈ T
v(t)− v(s)− g(t, s, z) ≤ c ∀t, s ∈ T
(vse)
Note that if the optimal value p∗ of this problem is less than or equal to
zero, then at least virtual surplus extraction is possible. We establish this in
the next lemma.
Lemma 2. If p∗ ≤ 0, then virtual surplus extraction holds. If p∗ < 0, or if
p∗ = 0 and is obtained in (vse), then full extraction holds.
35
Proof. To see this, first suppose p∗ < 0. Then there must exist z ∈ C(T ×S)
such that
f(t, z) ≤ 0 ∀t ∈ T
and
v(t)− v(s)− g(t, s, z) ≤ 0 ∀t, s ∈ T
In this case, full extraction holds, and thus a fortiori, virtual extraction holds
as well. Similarly, if p∗ = 0, then either p∗ is realized, in which case again
there must exist such a z ∈ C(T × S) as above so that full extraction holds,
or if p∗ is not realized, then for each ε > 0 there exists zε ∈ C(T × S) such
that
f(t, zε) ≤ ε ∀t ∈ T
and
v(t)− v(s)− g(t, s, zε) ≤ ε ∀t, s ∈ T
Now note that using continuity of π and v, this implies
π(t) · zε(t) ≥ −ε ∀t ∈ T
Thus
−ε ≤ π(t) · zε(t) ≤ ε ∀t ∈ T
Now set
z := zε − ε
and for each t ∈ T , set the contract c(t) to be
c(t) = v(t) + z(t)
Then c ∈ C(T × S), and for each t ∈ T ,
v(t)− π(t) · c(t) = v(t)− v(t)− π(t) · z(t)
= −π(t) · z(t)
= ε− π(t) · zε(t)
and by the preceding argument,
0 ≤ ε− π(t) · zε(t) ≤ 2ε
Thus for each t ∈ T ,
0 ≤ v(t)− π(t) · c(t) ≤ 2ε
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Then fix t ∈ T , and consider s 6= t.
v(t)− π(t) · c(s) = v(t)− v(s)− π(t) · z(s)
= v(t)− v(s)− π(t) · zε(s) + ε
≤ v(t)− v(s)− g(t, s, zε) + ε
≤ 2ε
Thus for all t ∈ T ,
v(t)− π(t) · c(s) ≤ 2ε ∀s 6= t
So for all t ∈ T ,
0 ≤ sup
s∈T
v(t)− π(t) · c(s) ≤ 2ε
The result follows.
Thus to show that virtual surplus extraction is possible, it suffices to
show that p∗ 6> 0. We establish this below by considering the dual of the
optimization problem (vse), and making use of duality to argue that these
problems have the same value. The heart of the proof is then to show that
this common value cannot be positive under probabilistic independence.
Theorem 9. Let S be a compact metric space. If types satisfy probabilistic
independence, then virtual extraction holds.
Proof. By Lemma 2, to show that virtual surplus extraction is possible it
suffices to show that p∗ 6> 0. To that end, note that the Lagrange dual
function for the problem (vse) is
L(λ, ν) = inf
c∈R
z∈C(T×S)
{c+ λ · (f(t, z)− c) + ν · (v(t)− v(s)− g(t, s, z)− c)}
where λ ∈M(T ) and ν ∈M(T × T ). Let d ∈ C(T × T ) be given by
d(t, s) = v(t)− v(s)
Note that d(t, t) = 0 for all t ∈ T .
Define
h(λ, ν) = inf
z∈C(T×S)
{λ · f(z) + ν · (d− g(z))}
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Using this notation, we can rewrite the Lagrange dual function for (vse) as
follows:
L(λ, ν) =
{
h(λ, ν) if
∫
λ(dt) +
∫∫
ν(ds dt) = 1
−∞ otherwise
Thus the dual problem of (vse) is
d∗ := sup
λ∈M(T ), ν∈M(T×T )
h(λ, ν)
subject to (λ, ν) ≥ 0∫
λ(dt) +
∫∫
ν(ds dt) = 1
(d-vse)
Then note that Slater’s condition holds for the original problem (vse). To
see this, set z = 0, so
f(t, z) = g(t, s, z) = 0 ∀t, s ∈ T
Then choose
c¯ > sup
t,s∈T
v(t)− v(s) ≥ 0
For (z, c) = (0, c¯),
sup
t∈T
f(t, z)− c = −c¯ < 0
and
sup
t,s∈T
v(t)− v(s)− g(t, s, z)− c = sup
t,s∈T
v(t)− v(s)− c¯ < 0
Thus p∗ = d∗ and in addition d∗ is obtained, where p∗ is the optimal value
of (vse) and d∗ is the optimal value of (d-vse).
Now it suffices to show that p∗ = d∗ 6> 0. To show this, suppose by way of
contradiction that p∗ = d∗ > 0. Since d∗ is obtained in (d-vse), there exists
(λ, ν) ≥ 0 such that
d∗ = h(λ, ν) > 0 and
∫
λ(dt) +
∫∫
ν(ds dt) = 1
Recall that, by definition,
h(λ, ν) = inf
z∈C(T×S)
(λ · f(z) + ν · (d− g(z)))
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and f(0) = g(0) = 0, which implies
h(λ, ν) ≤ ν · d
Since h(λ, ν) > 0, this implies ν · d > 0. Thus ν 6= 0. Since λ, ν ≥ 0, this
implies ν > 0.
Let F : C(T × S)→ R be given by
F (z) = λ · f(z) + ν · (d− g(z))
Note that F is convex and continuous, and by definition,
h(λ, ν) = inf
z∈C(T×S)
F (z) > 0
In particular, this implies infz∈C(T×S) F (z) ∈ R. By Ekeland’s Variational
Principle (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix), there exists a sequence {zn} and
a sequence {γn} with γn ∈ ∂F (zn) for each n such that
F (zn) = λ · f(zn) + ν · (d− g(zn))→ inf
z∈C(T×S)
F (z) = h(λ, ν) > 0
and
‖γn‖ → 0
By Lemmas 4, 5 and 6 (see the Appendix), since γn ∈ ∂F (zn) for each n, γn
is the measure for which
γn · y =
∫
π(t) · y(t)λ(dt)−
∫∫
π(s) · y(t)ν(ds dt)
for any measurable function y. But then note that γn is constant for each
n; let this constant measure be denoted γ. Since ‖γn‖ → 0, this implies
‖γ‖ = 0, and that γ · y = 0 for any such y.
Now fix A ⊆ T and let y be given by
y(t) =
{
0 if t 6∈ A
1(S) if t ∈ A
where 1(S) is the indicator of S. Then
γ · y =
∫
A
π(t) · y(t)λ(dt)−
∫∫
T×A
π(s) · y(t)ν(ds dt)
=
∫
A
λ(dt)−
∫∫
T×A
ν(ds dt)
= λ(A)− ν(T ×A)
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And γ · y = 0, which implies λ(A)− ν(T ×A) = 0, that is, λ(A) = ν(T ×A).
Since A was arbitrary, λ(A) = ν(T × A) for each A ⊆ T . From this it
follows first that λ(T ) = ν(T × T ), and since ν > 0, this implies λ(T ) =
ν(T × T ) > 0. Then without loss of generality, rescaling if necessary, take
λ(T ) = ν(T × T ) = 1. Second, this implies that, using disintegration of
measures, we can write
ν =
∫
νt(ds)λ(dt)
where νt is a measure on T , νt ≥ 0 and νt(T ) = 1 for each t in the support
of λ.
For each t ∈ T , let
γ(t) = π(t)−
∫
π(s)νt(ds)
Then γ is the measure given by
γ(E) =
∫
γ(t)(Et)λ(dt) ∀E ⊆ T × S
where for E ⊆ T × S, Et := {s ∈ S : (t, s) ∈ E}.
Then note that
‖γ‖ = sup
E
|γ(E)| by definition
= γ+(T × S) + γ−(T × S) by definition
=
∫ [
γ+(t)(S) + γ−(t)(S)
]
λ(dt)
=
∫
‖γ(t)‖λ(dt)
Recall from above
‖γ‖ =
∫
‖γ(t)‖λ(dt) = 0
By definition, ‖γ(t)‖ ≥ 0 for each t ∈ T , hence ‖γ(t)‖ = 0 for λ− a.e t ∈ T .
Thus for λ− a.e t ∈ T ,
γ(t) = π(t)−
∫
π(s)νt(ds) = 0
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where νt ∈ ∆(T ). Thus by probabilistic independence, νt = δt for λ−a.e t ∈
T .
But then
ν · d =
∫∫
d(s, t)ν(ds dt)
=
∫∫
d(s, t)νt(ds)λ(dt)
=
∫
supp λ
d(t, t)λ(dt)
= 0 since d(t, t) = 0 for all t ∈ T
This is a contradiction, as ν · d > 0. Thus p∗ ≤ 0.
6 Appendix
Because these results might be of independent interest, we include here the
derivation of the version of Ekeland’s Variational Principle that we used in
the proof of Theorem 9.
Before giving the main result of the appendix, we start with some pre-
liminary definitions and results, including the classic version of Ekeland’s
Variational Principle, and an extension due to Borwein, from which the main
result follows quickly.
Definition 12. For x ∈ dom f and ε > 0, the ε-subdifferential of f at x,
denoted ∂εf(x) is
∂εf(x) = {x∗ ∈ X∗ : f(y) ≥ f(x) + 〈x∗, y − x〉 − ε ∀y ∈ X}
Note: For any x ∈ dom f and any ε > 0,
• ∂εf(x) is closed and convex for every x
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• inf f ≤ f(xε) ≤ inf f + ε ⇐⇒ 0 ∈ ∂εf(xε)
• for ε = 0, ∂0f(x) = ∂f(x)
• if f is convex and lsc, then ∂εf(x) 6= ∅ for every x ∈ dom f
Next we state the classic version of Ekeland’s Variational Principle (Eke-
land, 1974).
Theorem 10. (Ekeland’s Variational Principle) Let V be a complete
metric space and F : V → R ∪ {+∞} be a proper, lsc function such that
inf F > −∞. Let ε > 0 and β > 0. For every u ∈ V such that
inf F ≤ F (u) ≤ inf F + ε
there exists v ∈ V such that
(i) F (v) ≤ F (u)
(ii) d(u, v) ≤ β
(iii) F (u) ≥ F (v)− ε
β
d(v, w) ∀w 6= v
If in addition F is convex, then
(iv) v can be chosen such that there exists g ∈ ∂F (v) such that ‖g‖ ≤ ε
β
More precise approximations can be given for convex functions, as shown
by Borwein (1982).
Theorem 11. (Borwein, 1982, Theorem 1) Let X be a Banach space
and f : X → R ∪ {+∞} be a proper, convex, lsc function. Let ε > 0 and
k ≥ 0 be given. Let
x∗0 ∈ ∂εf(x0)
Then there exist xε and x
∗
ε such that
x∗ε ∈ ∂f(xε)
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and such that
‖xε − x0‖ ≤
√
ε
|f(xε)− f(x0)| ≤
√
ε(
√
ε+
1
k
)
‖x∗ε − x∗0‖ ≤
√
ε(1 + k‖x∗0‖)
|x∗ε(h)− x∗0(h)| ≤
√
ε(‖h‖+ k|x∗0(h)|)
x∗ε ∈ ∂2εf(x0)
Putting these two results together yields the following.
Lemma 3. Let X be a Banach space and f : X → R be a proper, convex,
lsc function such that inf f > −∞. Then there exists a sequence {xn} in X
such that f(xn) → inf f and d(0, ∂f(xn)) → 0, i.e., there exists {gn} such
that gn ∈ ∂f(xn) for each n and ‖gn‖ → 0.
Proof. For each n ∈ N there exists xn such that
inf f ≤ f(xn) ≤ inf f + 1
4n2
Then 0 ∈ ∂ 1
4n2
f(xn) for each n.
By Borwein (1982, Theorem 1), for each n there exist x¯n and x¯
∗
n such
that (with k = 1 here)
x¯∗n ∈ ∂f(x¯n)
‖x¯n − xn‖ ≤ 1
2n
|f(x¯n)− f(xn)| ≤ 1
2n
(
1
2n
+ 1)
≤ 1
4n2
+
1
2n
≤ 1
n
‖x¯∗n − 0‖ = ‖x¯∗n‖ ≤
1
2n
(1 + 0) =
1
2n
|x¯∗n(h)| ≤
1
2n
‖h‖
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Then for each n,
inf f ≤ f(x¯n) ≤ f(xn) + 1
n
≤ inf f + 1
4n2
+
1
n
≤ inf f + 2
n
and
x¯∗n ∈ ∂f(x¯n) with ‖x¯∗n‖ ≤
1
2n
Thus f(x¯n)→ inf f and ‖x¯∗n‖ → 0.
Lemma 4. Let B be a compact metric space and X = C(B). Let f :
B × X → R be continuous, and for each b ∈ B, let fb : X → R be given
by fb(x) = f(b, x). Suppose fb is convex for each b ∈ B. Let h : X → R be
given by
h(x) =
∫
fb(x)µ(db)
where µ ∈M(B) and µ ≥ 0. Then h is convex, and
∂h(x) =
∫
∂fb(x)µ(db)
That is, for each γ ∈ ∂h(x) there is a mapping b 7→ γb such that γb ∈ ∂fb(x)
for µ- a.e b ∈ B and
γ · y =
∫
γb · y µ(db)
for any measurable y.
Proof. Since B is a compact metric space, X = C(B) is separable. The result
then follows from Ioffe and Levin (1972); see also Clarke (1990) Theorem 2.7.2
and discussion on pp. 76-77.
Lemma 5. Let f : T × C(T × S)→ R be given by
f(t, z) = π(t) · z(t)
and for each t ∈ T , let ft : C(T × S)→ R be given by ft(z) = f(t, z). Then
f is continuous and ft is convex for each t ∈ T . For each t ∈ T , if γ ∈ ∂ft(z)
then γ ∈M(T × S) is a measure such that for any measurable function y,
γ · y = π(t) · y(t)
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Proof. First, f is continuous, by construction. To see this, let (sn, zn) →
(t, z). Then
‖π(sn) · zn(sn)− π(t) · z(t)‖ = ‖(π(sn)− π(t)) · zn(sn) + π(t) · (zn(sn)− z(t))‖
≤ ‖(π(sn)− π(t)) · zn(sn)‖+ ‖π(t) · (zn(sn)− z(t))‖
≤ ‖π(sn)− π(t)‖‖zn(sn)‖+ ‖π(t) · (zn(sn)− z(t))‖
Since zn → z, {zn(sn)} and {zn(sn)− z(t)} are bounded, and zn(sn)→ z(t)
pointwise. Then ‖π(sn) − π(t)‖‖zn(sn)‖ → 0, since π(sn) → π(t) in norm,
and π(t) · (zn(sn) − z(t)) → 0 by the bounded convergence theorem. Thus
f(sn, zn)→ f(t, z).
By construction, ft is linear and continuous for each t ∈ T , and ∂ft(z) is
the measure γt ∈M(T × S) such that
γt · y = π(t) · y(t) for y measurable function
Lemma 6. Let g : T × T × C(T × S)→ R be given by
g(s,t)(z) := g(s, t, z) = π(s) · z(t)
Then g is continuous, and g(s,t) is concave for each t, s ∈ T . For each t, s ∈ T ,
if γ ∈ ∂g(s,t)(z) then γ ∈M(T×S) is a measure such that for any measurable
function y,
γ · y = π(s) · y(t)
Proof. This follows from arguments analogous to those used in the proof of
Lemma 5.
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